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Abstract
Humans have a strong preference for fair distributions of resources. Neuroimaging studies have shown that being treated
unfairly coincides with activation in brain regions involved in signaling conflict and negative affect. Less is known about
neural responses involved in violating a fairness norm ourselves. Here, we investigated the neural patterns associated with
inequity, where participants were asked to choose between an equal split of money and an unequal split that could either
maximize their own (advantageous inequity) or another person’s (disadvantageous inequity) earnings. Choosing to divide
money unequally, irrespective who benefited from the unequal distribution, was associated with activity in the dorsal
anterior cingulate cortex, anterior insula and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. Inequity choices that maximized another
person’s profits were further associated with activity in the ventral striatum and ventromedial prefrontal cortex. Taken
together, our findings show evidence of a common neural pattern associated with both advantageous and
disadvantageous inequity in sharing decisions and additional recruitment of neural circuitry previously linked to the
computation of subjective value and reward when violating a fairness norm at the benefit of someone else.
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Introduction
Although economic models assume that the maximization of
personal gains is the main motivation when distributing resources,
investigations of actual decision-making have shown that fairness
concerns play an important role in social interactions [1–6].
Indeed, the evidence is overwhelming: people have a preference
for fair outcomes and, all else being equal, acting fairly is generally
the expected social norm [1–8] and equality is often used as a
cognitive heuristic in decision-making [9]. In search of proximate
mechanisms it has been shown that equal distributions are
perceived as rewarding, both indicated by self-reported ratings
of fair divisions of resources as well as reward-related neural
activation patterns associated with these choices [7,8,10,11].
Further, being treated unfairly leads to anger [10–14] and has
been associated with activation of neural networks involved in
conflict and negative affect [12–16]. Finally, when confronted with
unfair treatment and given the power to retaliate, people generally
reject inequitable distributions of resources, even when this is
costly for them [2,15,16].
Despite this strong preference for equity and the aversion
towards inequity, people often make inequity choices, such as
when inequity is more advantageous for the self. For example,
people aim to increase relative advantage over others [2,17,18]
and when a high social position is experimentally induced they
become more selfish and display higher levels of immoral
behavior, such as cheating and lying [19–22]. It is thus crucial
to gain a better understanding of the neural mechanisms
underlying inequity decisions in order to better understand when
and why we decide to divide resources in an unequal fashion. The
current study aimed to investigate the neural responses associated
with inequity in sharing decisions when maximization of outcomes
for the self or another person is in conflict with the equity norm.
Using allocation tasks such as the ‘‘Dictator Game’’ where
participants divide a certain amount of rewards (i.e., the stake)
between themselves and another player without sanctions or
reputation-related consequences, many studies have shown that
people often give away a nontrivial amount of the stake to
anonymous others, with an equitable 50–50 split being the most
frequent allocation [17,18,21,23,24]. Nonetheless, such a prefer-
ence for fairness is highly sensitive to different aspects of the (social)
context in which they occur [19,21,22,25,26]. For example, a
preference for equity decreases when the costs of establishing equal
outcomes increase, supporting the crucial role of self-outcome
maximization in fairness considerations. Furthermore, people
seem to be less tolerant to receiving less than other people (i.e.,
disadvantageous inequity) compared to receiving more than others
(i.e., advantageous inequity) [7,12–14,21,23,24,27]. In other
words, fairness considerations are not solely shaped by other-
regarding preferences and prosocial intentions, but also by self-
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outcome maximization and aversion to disadvantageous inequity
[12,25,26].
Studies investigating the neural mechanisms associated with
inequity have predominantly focused on the perception and receipt
of unfair treatment [7,12–14,27,28]. These studies have consis-
tently shown involvement of the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex
(dACC) and the anterior insula in perceiving unfairness. Interest-
ingly, studies have shown heightened anterior insula activity when
people themselves are the target of unfair treatment [12] and when
they see someone else receiving an unfair offer [28]. Based on
anterior insula’s domain general role in providing anticipatory
emotional signals in decision-making [29–31] and the ACC and
insula’s involvement in neural representations of bodily arousal
states [29,32–34], it has been argued that the ACC and anterior
insula play an important role in guiding our social behavior to
follow social norms [35]. Behaviors in response to unfairness have
been consistently associated with activation in the dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex (dlPFC), which has been suggested to reflect
increased regulation of a default prepotent reaction to unfair offers
[13,27,36–40]. Although these findings overall support the idea
that equity is perceived as a social norm, fewer studies have
investigated how neural responses to unfairness might be different
when making inequity decisions. Two studies investigating
allocation of resources to others who had previously excluded
the participants from a social interaction have shown the
involvement of the ACC – insula network when sharing unequally
with those excluders [41,42]. In the current study, we aimed to
investigate whether inequity choices are processed differently than
equity choices and how this depends on the benefit for the self and
the other. For this purpose, we investigated inequity choices in
different experimental conditions that aimed to disentangle
inequity that is advantageous for the self from inequity that is
advantageous for another person (while leaving the decision-
maker’s own outcome unaffected).
First, based on previous findings, we expected higher insula and
dACC activity when making inequity choices in general [29,33]. A
central question was whether the insula and dACC response
subserves a general role through acting as a ‘‘social alarm system’’
that is activated in response to both advantageous and disadvan-
tageous inequity, i.e. regardless of whether the participants
themselves or another person benefits from the inequity. If equity
were perceived as the social norm, we would expect higher levels
of insula and dACC activity in making inequity choices across
different conditions that differ in relative outcomes for self and
other. However, if other-regarding (prosocial) outcomes were
perceived as the social norm, we would expect increased levels of
activation in this network when making choices that ensure equity,
but also lead to less optimal outcomes for others.
Second, we tested the hypothesis that inequity choices that lead
to benefit of others is associated with activation in neural circuitry
previously linked to reward-processing. This hypothesis is based on
prior studies wherein participants were the allocators of resources
and that showed that neural regions implicated in the computation
of subjective value and reward play an important role in resource
distribution [29,33]. Although the paradigms used in these studies
differed considerably, these prior studies showed that reward-
related brains regions [e.g. the striatum and ventromedial PFC
(vmPFC)] were associated with choosing outcomes that maximized
the amount of joint resources. However, paradigms in these studies
did not investigate two core processes of fairness considerations,
namely, choices that incur costs to the self [29] and a fair
alternative to making inequity choices [33]. In the current study,
we included similar experimental conditions that involved a fair
alternative to inequity and that also differed in respective possible
costs and benefits for the self and the other. We expected that
choices indicating other-regarding preferences through a maximi-
zation of the other’s outcomes would result in increased activation




Twenty-eight young adults (M = 20.7 years, SD = 1.91; 11 male)
were recruited through local advertisements. All participants were
right-handed and did not report any contraindications for fMRI.
Before scanning participants were familiarized with the scanner
environment using a mock scanner. After scanning, they filled out
a battery of questionnaires, and received J25 for their participa-
tion and an additional amount of money, which was told to be
determined by their decisions in the allocation games. In reality
everyone received an additional J2. The current study was
conducted in accordance with the ethical standards of the
American Psychological Association as expressed in the Declara-
tion of Helsinki. All participants provided written informed
consent for the study. The study was approved by the Leiden
University Medical Center (LUMC) ethics committee. A radiol-
ogist reviewed all anatomical scans; no anomalies were reported.
fMRI task description
Participants played the role of the allocator in a set of three
modified dictator games [21]. In each game the participants were
asked to distribute coins between themselves and an anonymous
other player based on preset dichotomous choices. One of the two
options was always a fair (equal) distribution of coins, i.e. one coin
for the self and one coin for the other (1/1). The alternative
distribution in the three games were as follows: i) one coin for the
self and zero coins for the other (i.e., 1/0) in the Advantageous
Competitive Inequity game, where the inequity choice maximized
the difference between self and other without gains relative to the
equity choice, ii) two coins for the self and zero coins for the other
(i.e., 2/0) in the Advantageous Self-maximizing Inequity game,
where the inequity choice maximized outcomes for the self, and iii)
one coin for the self and two coins for the other (i.e., 1/2) in the
Disadvantageous Prosocial Inequity game, where the inequity
choice signified other-regarding (i.e., prosocial) concerns.
Each trial started with a jittered fixation cross (mean = 1540 ms,
min = 550 ms, max = 4950 ms; optimized with Opt-Seq2, sur-
fer.nmr.mgh.harvard.edu/optseq/; [43]). On the left hand side of
this screen, participants were also presented with the name of the
other player (see Fig. 1A). This was followed by the decision screen
where participants were presented with two distributions (i.e., two
buckets with coins in them) they could choose between. In each
distribution coins for the self were indicated in red and coins for
the other were indicated in blue. Participants had 4000 ms to
make a choice. Upon making a choice, the bucket of their choice
was encircled in red and this was displayed until the end of
5000 ms in total. In case of no response within the 4000 ms
period, participants were presented a screen with ‘Too late!’ for
the duration of 1000 ms. Trials without a response consisted of less
than 1% of all trials and were excluded from further analyses.
Prior to scanning participants were provided with instructions (see
Text S1) and practiced the game (6 trials) on a computer. During
the scanning session participants played a total of 60 trials, with 20
trials of each game, in randomized order. The location of the
equal distribution was counterbalanced across trials. All trials were
presented in one block lasting about 8 minutes.
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On each trial, the first name and the first letter of the surname
of both the participant and the recipient were displayed on screen
to ensure anonymity, but also to emphasize the notion that
participants would play each trial with a new player (see
Figure 1A). Participants were told that random trials would be
selected and their choices on these trials would determine their
final earnings in the task. Prior to the experiment, participants
were explained that the recipients were participants in the study
and it was also emphasized that their decisions would have
consequences for the other players’ earnings. None of the
participants reported disbelief in the cover story that their offers
influenced other players’ outcomes.
fMRI data acquisition
Scanning was carried out at the University Medical Centre
using a 3.0 T Philips Achieva. The scanning procedure included: i)
a localizer scan, ii) T2*-weighted whole-brain echo planar images
(EPI) measuring the bold-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) signal
(TR = 2.2 s, TE = 30 ms, slice matrix = 80680, slice thick-
ness = 2.75 ms, slice gap = 0.28 mm, field of view
(FOV) = 220 mm), iii) high-resolution T1- and T2- weighted
matched bandwidth anatomical images with the same slice
prescriptions as the EPIs. Functional data were acquired in a
single functional run of 210 volumes; the first two volumes were
discarded to allow for equilibration of T1 saturation effects. The
task was programmed in E-prime and was projected onto a screen
that was viewed through a mirror fastened upon the head coil
assembly. Head movement was restricted by the use of foam
inserts around the head.
MRI data analysis
Image pre-processing and analysis was conducted using SPM8
software (www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). Pre-processing included
slice-time correction, realignment, spatial normalization to EPI
templates, and smoothing with a Gaussian filter of 8 mm full-
width at half maximum. Movement parameters in all directions
were below 1.08 mm for all participants and all scans. The fMRI
time series were modeled by a series of events convolved with a
canonical hemodynamic response function (HRF). The data were
modeled at stimulus onset of the decision screen with zero
duration and based on the game (3 levels: Advantageous
Competitive Inequity, Advantageous Self-maximizing Inequity
and Disadvantageous Prosocial Inequity) and participant’s choice
(2 levels: equity or inequity), resulting in a 362 full factorial model
that included six regressors. The participant-specific contrast
images were obtained at the subject level and were then submitted
Figure 1. Visual display of the fMRI task and frequency of inequity choices. (A) Visual display of events presented in the one trial of the fMRI
task. Each trial started with a jittered fixation cross lasting 550–4950 ms. The following screen displayed the name of the participant in red (here
‘Participant’) and the name of the recipient (here ‘Amanda Y.’). This screen also presented the available choice options for distributing the coins (here
Advantageous Self-Maximizing Inequity game; 1/1 vs 2/0) with red and blue coins indicating the share for the participant and the recipient,
respectively. The participant had a maximum response time of 4000 ms to make a choice. Upon response, the chosen distribution was encircled in
red (here 1/1) until the end of the 5000 ms. (B) Percentage of inequity choices made in each of the three games. **p,.001, *p,.05. (C) Percentage of
inequity choices made by each participant in each of the three games.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0107996.g001
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to group level analyses at the second level, where participants
served as a random effect in a repeated measures ANOVA. The
full factorial ANOVA had an unbalanced design with varying
number of participants in each cell of the model due to the fact
that not all participants chose all options. The number of
participants included in each cell of the design is as follows:
Advantageous Competitive Inequity Game Equity choice (n = 25),
Advantageous Competitive Inequity Game Inequity choice
(n = 11), Advantageous Self-maximizing Inequity Game Equity
choice (n = 19), Advantageous Self-maximizing Inequity Game
Inequity choice (n = 22), Disadvantageous Prosocial Inequity
Game Equity choice (n = 20), and Disadvantageous Prosocial
Inequity Game Inequity choice (n = 18). We also conducted
follow-up analyses examining the t-contrasts of Inequity . Equity
for each game separately. Mean percentage of inequity offers in
each game was used in regression analyses to test for brain-
behavior relations in a GLM model based on the game (collapsed
across choices; 3 levels: Advantageous Competitive Inequity,
Advantageous Self-maximizing Inequity and Disadvantageous
Prosocial Inequity). The fMRI analyses were conducted at the
threshold of p,.001 uncorrected with a voxel threshold of 10
functional voxels to balance between Type 1 and Type 2 errors
[44]. Regions of interest (ROI) analyses were further conducted on
the regions obtained from the whole-brain analyses using the
MARSBAR tool in SPM8 [45]. All results are reported in the
MNI305 (Montreal Neurological Institute) stereotactic space.
Results
Behavioral results
An examination of response patterns of the participants showed
that they had strong preferences for equity or inequity choices,
which depended on the costs for self and other (see Table 1). A
detailed overview of these choices per participant can be seen in
Figure 1C. Percentage of inequity choices across the three
conditions was compared using a repeated measure ANOVA,
which yielded a significant main effect of Game (F(2,54) = 8.4,
p = .001, gp
2 = .24; Fig. 1B). Participants chose the inequity
distribution more often in the Advantageous Self-maximizing
Inequity condition (M = .60, SD = .43) than in the Disadvanta-
geous Prosocial Inequity condition (M = .39, SD = .44; F (1,
27) = 4.90, p,.05, gp
2 = .15) and in the Advantageous Compet-
itive Inequity condition (M = .18, SD = .33; F (1, 27) = 21.98, p,
.001, gp
2 = .45). Inequity choices in the latter two conditions did
not differ significantly from each other (p = .09, gp
2 = .10). There
was also a significant correlation between inequity choices in the
Disadvantageous Prosocial Inequity and the Advantageous Com-
petitive Inequity conditions (r (28) = 2.41, p,.05).
Neuroimaging results
In order to examine the neural correlates of equity and inequity
choices, we conducted the Inequity . Equity and reverse contrasts
within the 3 (Game)62 (Choice) ANOVA. The Inequity . Equity
t-contrast revealed a network of regions comprising bilateral insula
(x/y/z coordinates: 230, 21, 212; 19 voxels and 27, 24, 29; 95
voxels), right IFG (54, 21, 18; 12 voxels), dorsal ACC (6, 39, 21; 46
voxels and 0, 24, 36; 61 voxels), and dorsolateral (27, 45, 36; 22
voxels) and ventrolateral PFC (30, 54, 23; 49 voxels)
(t(109) = 3.17; Figure 2; activation levels obtained from ROI
analyses in right insula is plotted for demonstration purposes in
a bar graph of activation per game and offer). The reverse contrast
(Equity.Inequity) did not yield any clusters of activation and the
game by choice interaction also did not result in significant
activation. Thus, insula, ACC and dlPFC were activated in
response to choosing an unequal distribution of resources,
regardless of the consequences of this distribution for self or other
in terms of maximizing outcomes or costs.
Next, in order to examine inequity related neural responses in
more depth, we focused on the Inequity . Equity and reverse
contrasts in the context of each of the three games separately using
t-tests. The Equity . Inequity contrast did not yield activation in
any of the three games. We also did not detect any regions for the
Inequity . Equity contrasts in the Advantageous Competitive
(n = 8) and the Advantageous Self-maximizing (n = 13) games at
the chosen threshold, but note that the effects reported above are
partially replicated at a more lenient threshold (see Table S1).
The Inequity . Equity contrast in the Disadvantageous
Prosocial Inequity condition (n = 10) yielded increased activation
in the vmPFC (6, 48, 0; 62 voxels), ventral striatum (12, 21, 0; 11
voxels), and right anterior insula (45, 15, 26; 53 voxels) during
inequity choices than equity choices (Figure 3; activation levels
obtained from ROI analyses in ventral striatum and vmPFC are
plotted for demonstration purposes in a bar graph of activation per
game and offer). Importantly, here the inequity choices were not
only disadvantageous for the self relative to the other player, but
also beneficial for the other player. Post-hoc ROI analyses showed
that higher activation in these regions during inequity than equity
was specific for the Disadvantageous Prosocial Inequity game;
inequity and equity related activity in the Advantageous Compet-
itive and Advantageous Self-maximizing Inequity games did not
differ significantly in any of the regions (all p..25).
Finally, we examined brain-behavior relations by conducting
whole-brain regressions where inequity choice frequency was
included as a regressor in activations involved in the Disadvan-
tageous Prosocial Inequity Game (collapsed across choices) – null
contrast (n = 28). This approach enabled us to examine the
relation between frequency of inequity choices and brain
activation across the complete sample of 28 participants, whereas
the previously reported inequity vs. equity and reverse contrasts
could be examined only among the 10 participants who had made
both equity and inequity choices in the Disadvantageous Prosocial
Inequity condition. This analysis resulted in a set of regions in
which activation correlated positively with inequity choices,
including the precuneus (29, 257, 248; 25 voxels), ventromedial
Table 1. Frequency (and percentage) of participants making 100% equity, 100% inequity or both choices across the trials per
game.
Game 100% Equity 100% Inequity Both
Disadvantageous Prosocial Inequity (1/2) 10 (37.5%) 8 (28.6%) 10 (37.5%)
Advantageous Competitive Inequity (1/0) 17 (60.7%) 3 (10.7%) 8 (28.6%)
Advantageous Self-maximizing Inequity (2/0) 6 (21.4%) 9 (32.1%) 13 (46.4%)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0107996.t001
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PFC (15, 45, 0; 23 voxels), and dlPFC (MNI 24, 39, 42; 33 voxels)
(Figure 4; the relation between DLPFC activation and frequency
of inequity offers is demonstrated in a scatterplot). There was no
activation in brain regions of interest in the brain-behavior
correlations for the other two games (see Table S2).
Discussion
The current study set out to investigate the common and
distinct neural responses associated with inequity decisions
involved in maximizing outcomes for the self or another person.
Our behavioral results demonstrate that participants more often
chose unequal distributions in situations where their own profits
could be maximized relative to alternatives where they could
maximize the other person’s profits. The neuroimaging findings
showed that choosing inequity regardless of whether it entails
benefits for the other is associated with increased activation in the
anterior insula, dACC and dlPFC. In addition, decisions to
distribute resources unequally, but in a way that benefits another
person’s profits additionally coincided with increased activation in
ventral striatum, vmPFC, precuneus and dlPFC. Taken together,
our findings show that there is a common neural response to
making advantageous and disadvantageous inequity choices,
which resembles the pattern of neural activity previously
associated with being treated unfairly [12–14,28]. Furthermore,
we show a distinct neural response associated with prosocial
inequity, which suggests that violating a fairness norm in order to
increase another person’s outcomes is processed differently on a
neural level compared to selfish violations of a fairness norm.
Our behavioral findings show that participants adjusted their
behavior depending on the available alternatives to an equal split.
In doing so, it seems that different principles interact to guide
decision-making when distributing resources: a social norm of
equity, (possible) costs for the self, and a concern for outcomes of
others relative to the self. Whereas an equal distribution was the
most preferred option when it did not involve possible costs to the
allocator (i.e., the participant), equal distributions became less
preferred when it was costly to establish them. This finding is in
line with previous studies on fairness preferences, which show that,
although an equal split is used as a cognitive heuristic, contextual
factors related to the relevance of self-interest systematically shifts
preferences away from an equal split [9]. Preference for an equal
distribution was not only influenced by absolute costs, as in the
Advantageous Self-maximizing Inequity condition, but also in
terms of relative costs compared to the other player, as in the
Disadvantageous Prosocial Inequity condition. This latter finding
demonstrates that a preference for equal outcomes does not
necessarily have to be grounded in a prosocial motivation, but
might also result from the desire to avoid receiving lower payoffs
than another person [2,28,46,47].
Figure 2. Neural network associated with inequity. Network of brain regions from the Inequity . Equity contrast in the 3 (Game) 62 (Choice)
full factorial ANOVA; p,.001, 10 voxel threshold. Bar graph displays contrast estimates obtained from ROI analysis in right anterior insula (MNI 27, 24,
29) for inequity and equity choices in the three conditions. Error bars indicate SEM.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0107996.g002
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Neuroimaging results further show that there is a common
neural response in dACC, bilateral anterior insula and dlPFC to
both advantageous and disadvantageous inequity. This suggests
that a general neural mechanism is implicated in signaling
deviations from a fairness norm in sharing decisions, regardless
of who benefits from the unequal distribution of goods. Our
findings corroborate previous findings showing that both advan-
tageous and disadvantageous inequity were associated with
anterior insula activity [48] and a heightened medial frontal
negativity [49], which has been interpreted as suggesting the
involvement of the insula-ACC network in norm and associated
expectancy violations. The dACC and the anterior insula are part
of a ‘‘salience network’’ that serves an important domain general
role in integrating cognitive and emotional signals when processing
motivationally salient information [47,50]. Activation in this
network has been associated with error processing [51], uncer-
tainty [52], conflict [53] and violations of a social norms
[28,46,47,54,55]. We extend previous research by showing that
the insula and dACC are also activated when creating inequity in
choices that involve possible costs to the self and a fair alternative
to inequity, both of which are core components of fairness
considerations previously not investigated using fMRI.
Increased dlPFC activity during both advantageous and
disadvantageous inquity choices relative to equity choices fits with
findings from a recent study showing dlPFC involvement in both
advantageous and disadvantageous inequity in a game in which
participants received less or more money than another person after
performing a perceptual task [56]. Based on its role in cognitive
control and goal-directed behavior it has been argued that dlPFC
activity in social decision-making tasks reflects increased control
over prepotent responses that are aimed to maximize self-gain
[27,36,39,57,58]. Our results suggest that dlPFC activity might
reflect higher levels of executive control required to violate a
salient social norm regardless of whether this maximizes gains for
the self or someone else. The notion that this is not restricted to
maximizing outcomes for the self was supported by our individual
differences analyses that showed that participants who more often
chose outcomes that maximize the profits of the other over an
equal distribution recruit the dlPFC to a greater extent when doing
so.
In addition to a common neural pattern associated with
inequity, we also found that violations of a fairness norm in the
Disadvantageous Prosocial Inequity condition were associated
with activation in the striatum and the vmPFC. Activation in these
regions associated with such prosocial behavior that leads to better
outcomes for another person is in line with prior findings showing
that the striatum not only responds to primary rewards, but also to
social rewards such as charitable donations [59,60], maximizing
another person’s outcomes [33,61,62], and mutual cooperation in
a prisoner’s dilemma paradigm [21,26,61,63]. Moreover, individ-
ual differences analyses showed that the more frequent people
showed this other-outcome maximizing behavior, the more they
activated the vmPFC and the precuneus. The vmPFC is not only
important for the encoding the subjective value of rewards [64,65],
but is also part of a network, including the precuneus, dorsomedial
prefrontal cortex and the temporo-parietal junction [66,67]
important for mental state-reasoning [14,41,68,69] and perspec-
tive-taking [60]. Moreover activation in the mPFC has been
shown to be associated with processing one’s own and other
people’s actions and intentions in economic games [61,62]. Acting
in a way that does not necessarily benefit outcomes for the self, but
is beneficial to another person’s gains might thus possibly require
increased levels of perspective-taking. It would be recommended
for future studies to assess self-reported subjective value associated
Figure 3. Neural network involved in Disadvantageous Prosocial Inequity. Ventral striatum (MNI 12, 21, 0) and ventromedial PFC (MNI 6, 48,
0) from the Inequity . Equity contrast in the Disadvantageous Prosocial Inequity condition; p,.001, 10 voxel threshold. Bar graphs display contrast
estimates obtained from ROI analyses for inequity and equity choices in the three conditions. Error bars indicate SEM.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0107996.g003
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with individuals’ choices of advantageous and disadvantageous
inequity in order to be able to examine how experience of reward
is related to the neural signal associated with these choices.
Several limitations of the current study should be noted. One of
the main challenges of the current research design is related to
individual differences in observed behavior. As indicated by the
behavioral patterns (see Figure 1C), the majority of participants
were consistent in their choices within a certain condition, which
might be considered desired given that this consistency reflects
stable individual preferences and implies that participants did not
choose randomly. However, this resulted in relatively small
numbers of observations in several neuroimaging analyses where
choice-related neural activation was examined based on contrasts
of inequity versus equity choices per condition. For example,
although there was a main effect of the Inequity . Equity contrast
across conditions, these effects could not be observed when this
contrast was examined per condition separately at the chosen
threshold, but was only evident at more lenient threshold levels. In
addition, the results may represent the neural activity of
individuals who are ambiguous about equity choices, and in
future research it should be examined whether these also represent
choices of individuals with strict equity norms. Previous behavioral
studies using the three allocation games have also examined
profiles of individual behavior patterns [21,26]. In the current
study, our sample size did not allow us to examine the neural
correlates of individual behavioral profiles. Future studies
employing larger sample sizes should aim to examine individual
differences in neural activation related to profiles of behavior.
The individual differences in behavior also resulted in an
unbalanced design in our fMRI analysis. In other words, due to
the fact that not all participants made all choices in each game, it
was not possible to conduct a balanced full-factorial analysis with
the same number of observations in each cell of the design. Future
studies can aim to manipulate the study design in order to obtain a
more balanced response pattern or, as indicated above, aim for
larger sample sizes that will enable to examine individual
differences based on choice profiles.
Furthermore, the current study did not employ self-report
explicit measures about cognitive and affective processes related to
making (inequity) choices. Future research should include mea-
sures about beliefs on fairness norms, affect related to inequity
choices or autonomic measurements, such as heart rate, which can
provide the researchers with additional measures in interpreting
behavioral and neural findings.
The current results offer a number of avenues for future
research. For example, our current design did not allow for a
dissociation between joint-outcome maximization and maximiza-
tion of another person’s outcomes in the disadvantageous inequity
(1/2) choices. Future studies could include a condition where the
1/1 option is pitted against a 2/1 distribution, in which the latter
choice would both be self- and joint outcome maximization [70].
A contrast between the 2/1 and 1/2 choices could disentangle
joint outcome maximization from person-specific (self vs. other)
outcome maximization. Furthermore, using the same set of three
allocation tasks [21,26] and other paradigms [71,72] it has been
shown that across development children and adolescents increas-
Figure 4. Neural network related to frequency of inequity choices. Brain regions from the regression of neural activity during the
Disadvantageous Prosocial Inequity game with frequency of inequity choices. (A) Activation in the ventromedial PFC (MNI 15, 45, 0), precuneus (MNI -
9, -57, -48), and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC; MNI 24, 39, 42) correlates positively with the frequency of inequity choices in the
Disadvantageous Prosocial Inequity condition; p,.001, 10 voxel threshold. (B) Scatter plot displays contrast estimates for the Disadvantageous
Prosocial Inequity condition on the y-axis and behavior (% inequity) on the x-axis (N = 28).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0107996.g004
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ingly start enforcing equality between the ages of 3 and 13. Recent
developmental work has shown that developmental changes in late
maturing brain regions such as regions of the mentalizing network
and the lateral PFC are associated with developmental increases in
intentionality understanding and strategic considerations in
fairness decisions [14,37]. It would be of great interest to relate
behavioral changes in both advantageous and disadvantageous
inequity choices to brain development, because taking a develop-
mental perspective has the potential to enhance not only our
understanding of social development, but could also provide
insights into adult social decision-making and its underlying
mechanisms.
Taken together, the current results further inform our
understanding of an important aspect of human social behavior,
that is, when and why we decide to divide resources unequally. We
show that violations of an equity norm, both with selfish (i.e.,
advantageous) and prosocial (i.e., disadvantageous) outcomes, are
associated with a common neural response in the ‘‘salience
network’’. Furthermore, prosocial violations of a simple fairness
norm were associated with activation in brain regions that code for
primary and more complex social rewards [29,33] and switching
attention to another person’s perspective [60–62]. These findings
show that neural networks implicated in social cognition, domain
general cognitive functions and emotional processes are important
for both following social norms and for violating such norms when
these violations serve a more prosocial purpose than the norm
itself.
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